As I have been reading through his works, in preparation for a class on the essence and attributes of God, I have been paying close attention the doctrine of divine simplicity. And so, the body of this essay will be an exposition of Athanasius’ views on simplicity from his treatise Contra Gentes (Against the Heathens). In this treatise, Athanasius establishes Christian theism against the pantheistic philosophies that the heathens held. Pantheism asserts that all of creation is identical with God. But God is spiritual; the world is material, so the two cannot be one and identical.
Starting in chapter 28, Athanasius challenges the pagan notion that God is the cosmic organism. Reason being is that it would entail parts in God. He argues that God “stands in need of nothing, but is self-sufficient and self-contained, and that in Him all things have their being.”[1] His aim is to refute the error of creation worship, whereby the heathens worship a sun god and a moon god, among others. However, they combine all ‘gods’ together as one body, calling the whole as God. Athanasius shows the absurdity of such belief by contrasting the God of the Bible with their god of parts. He writes,
For if the combination of the parts makes up the whole, and the whole is combined out of the parts, then the whole consists of the parts, and each of them is a portion of the whole. But this is very far removed from the conception of God. For God is a whole and not a number of parts, and does not consist of diverse elements, but is Himself the Maker of the system of the universe. For see what impiety they utter against the Deity when they say this. For if He consists of parts, certainly it will follow that He is unlike Himself, and made up of unlike parts. For if He is sun, He is not moon, and if He is moon, He is not earth, and if He is earth, He cannot be sea: and so on, taking the parts one by one, one may discover the absurdity of this theory of theirs.[2]
His refutation is sound, especially where he says, “for if he consists of parts, certainly it will follow that he is unlike himself, and made up of unlike parts.” Athanasius retains the uniqueness and (a nascent) simplicity of God (though not expressly calling it that) in that for God to be who he is in his essence, he must be who he is through himself, not by parts because he would then be “unlike himself.” God must be pure in himself as “Maker” of all that exists. Athanasius began his argument in pointing out God’s aseity. And at the end of chapter 28, he makes another claim as to why God cannot be made up of parts: because that which has parts (i.e., all material beings) “are destined to be divided again, in accordance with the natural tendency of the parts to separation.”[3] So, Athanasius understands that to have parts is proper to that which is created (that which goes in and out of existence), not to that which is uncreated (and necessarily exists). Why is that? Because material beings are composite beings, having parts constitutes who/what they are. The parts make up what they are, which, Athanasius interestingly observes, will be divided again at some point.[4] To have parts is to be a material being, and all material beings will be divided again.
Jumping to chapter 41, he expounds further the notion of composition but directing his attention to the Word, who having no composition is fully present to creation as its Creator but also its sustainer. Using a play-on-words approach, he says as Christ is the Word, “he is not after the likeness of human words, composed of syllables.” The Word is one syllable. Humans are “composed of parts and made out of nothing,” being composite and divisible. It is interesting to notice the adjectival phrases in his statement, which seem to be opposed to each other: composed of parts yet made out of nothing. But that is easy to clear up. We must remember that to say God creates out of nothing, it means that God creates out of nothing apart from himself (Rom 11:36).[5] Athanasius makes another contrast, a simple/composite contrast. He says, “God possesses true existence and is not composite, wherefore His Word also has true Existence and is not composite.” For Athanasius, non-compositeness is true existence. And only God and his Word have true existence because God has life in himself, aseity. He is being; creatures are given being or have their being imparted to them. True existence only God can have because he is his existence. And that is what later formulations of simplicity arrive at (cf. Aquinas, ST, 1.3.3), in that God is necessary, uncreated Being. Therefore, his existence is necessary. And he cannot give himself existence or himself being, and he cannot be given essence and existence from some prior supreme being; therefore, the logic of simplicity entails that God is his own essence and is his own existence; his essence and existence are the same.[6] That is true existence. That which has being (essence) and has existence—creatures—are composite beings.
Following his assertion of the non-compositeness (i.e., the simplicity) of the Word, as “the one and only begotten God, who proceeds in his goodness from the Father as from a good fountain,”[7] Athanasius expresses the “truly wonderful” act by the Word in uniting himself to his creation. God’s eternal Word, Athanasius writes, has given “substantial existence to Creation,” having its “being out of nothing.” The creation is by nature weak and mortal, “subject to dissolution,” but in “desiring all to exist, as objects of his loving-kindness,” and so that it does not fall out of existence, the Word “guides and settles the whole Creation.” Athanasius makes the distinction between the Creator and the creature, in that the creation coming into existence from nothing, it is, by nature, weak, mortal, and composite. And so, the contrast he is making between that which is being and that which has being is intended to demonstrate the Word’s astounding love for a creation, which is “at risk of dropping out of existence.” And the Word sustains Creation by way of participation. Athanasius writes, “for it partakes of the Word Who derives true existence from the Father.” While it seems that Athanasius is insinuating that the Word is given his being, we have to take note of the distinction he maintains in that the Word “derives true existence,” whereas Creation has existence by participation. If you recall a few paragraphs ago, we defined what Athanasius means by true existence, which is to have existence in himself and from himself as only God does have, which the Word, though said to be from the Father, is “Himself also God.”
Athanasius grounds his understanding about the Word in Colossians 1:15–16, where the Word is the manifestation of the invisible God, the express image of the Divine nature. For the Word to be divine, he must fully possess what is proper to divinity. We hold to a monotheistic view of God, so then do we have two Gods? We do not. Scripture ascribes the fullness of divinity to the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. While I did not expound on the role of simplicity as it pertains to the Triunity of God, the doctrine of simplicity functions as a safeguard to keep us wandering off into tritheism. Simplicity is the divinity of God. If you would like to learn more about the doctrine of divine simplicity, see my recent lecture on it.
But one thing has been confirmed in my survey of the Early Church Fathers, through which I am still trekking, is the assertion by Richard Muller, who states: “The doctrine of divine simplicity is among the normative assumptions of theology from the time of the church fathers, to the age of the great medieval scholastic systems, to the era of Reformation and post-Reformation theology, and indeed, on into the succeeding era of late orthodoxy and rationalism.”[8] While I have much more to read through, it is fascinating to see the consistency of this doctrine through the Christian tradition.
~ Romans 11:36
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[1] Athanasius, Contra Gentes, 28.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] See my post on Anselm’s view of creation.
[6] Aquinas writes, “God is not only His own essence , . . but also His own existence.” ST, 1.3.4. For a modern treatment on this topic see, James E. Dolezal, God without Parts: Divine Simplicity and the Metaphysics of God’s Absoluteness (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2011).
[7] Athanasius, C. Gent., 41.1.
[8] Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003), 3:39.
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