Below
is part of the introductory section to my exposition of John Chrysostom’s
doctrine of God. I posted it because I thought it was fascinating to find such
an important theologian known for avoiding (even having a disdain of)
speculative theology refer to the classical doctrine of divine simplicity as
common place in his thoroughly biblical doctrine of God. Toward the end I include
a link to my full exposition.
John Chrysostom (ca. 347–407) was the archbishop of Constantinople. Being the
most prolific of all the Eastern fathers, he fought against the ecclesiastical
and political leaders for their abuse of authority. He was called Chrysostom
(meaning “golden-mouthed”) for his eloquent sermons.[1] This
most distinguished of Greek patristic preachers excelled in spiritual and moral
application in the Antiochene tradition of literal exegesis, largely
disinterested, even untutored in speculative and controversial theology.[2]
On the Incomprehensible Nature of God[3] (De incomp.) will be the focus of
exposition. As mentioned, Chrysostom did not have an affinity for speculative
theology. But it will be interesting to observe how he goes about formulating
his thought on such a topic. De incomp. is a polemical and apologetical
work aimed at a new uprising of Arian followers. This new crop of extremists
were known as the Anomoeans. They maintained that God is simple and one;
unbegotten and not produced. No being, therefore, could be begotten or produced,
thus no being could be of the same substance (homoousios), of similar
substance (homoiousios) nor like (homoios) God; but it must be
dissimilar and unlike (anomoios) God—hence the name Anomoeans.[4]
While
man cannot know the essence of God, the Anomoeans call the divine essence agennetos,
“ungendered.” The Anomoeans argued that if we do not know God’s essence, then
we do not know what we are adoring. But Chrysostom responds that we are not
required to know what God is just that he is. We can know who he is without
needing to know what his essence is; thus speculation of his essence is not
expected of us.[5]
De incomp. is divided up into twelve homilies, with the first five
dealing with the incomprehensible nature of God, the sixth is an interruption
of sorts, with seven through twelve focused on the Son’s substance being the
same (homoousios) as the Father. Chrysostom does not write with the
theological depth as we find in Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, or Gregory of
Nazianzus. His audience is made up of laymen, orthodox and heterodox, who he is
trying to edify and sway from error.[6]
In Homily 1, Chrysostom begins with a confession of his own (humble) ignorance,
regarding his knowledge about God but lacks the ability to explain it. He
writes,
I know that God is everywhere, and I know that he is everywhere in his whole being. But I do not know how he is everywhere. I know that he is eternal and has no beginning. But I do not know how. My reason fails to grasp how it is possible for an essence to exist when that essence has received its existence neither from itself nor from another. I know that he begot a Son. But I do not know how. I know that the Spirit is from him. But I do not know how the Spirit is from him. (De incomp. 1.19)
His point is to direct his opponents away from “meddling” with the essence of
God. He sees that such inquisitiveness is the very height of folly, pointing out
how the inspired prophets of Scripture were unable to grasp the vastness of his
wisdom, which comes from his essence, so how foolish and mad it is that the
Anomoeans think “that they could make his very essence subject to their power
and processes of reasoning” (De incomp. 1.23). Chrysostom quotes the
prophet of grace, David, who, in speaking of God’s omnipresence, is dumbfounded
at the realization that whether he goes up to heaven or down to hell, God is
there (Ps 139:8). And while God has revealed secret and hidden things to David,
he says God’s wisdom is inaccessible and incomprehensible, having no limit (Ps.
147:5). Again, Chrysostom is rebuking and exhorting the Anomoeans to let go of
their arrogant assertions, thinking they can limit his essence and greatness (De
incomp. 1.26).
Chrysostom addresses the Anomoean’s interpretation of First Corinthians 13:12,
which says, “My knowledge is imperfect now; then I shall know even as I was
known.” For some strange reason, the Anomoeans state Paul is talking about
God’s governance of the universe. Chrysostom replies that Paul is saying his
“present knowledge of God is imperfect and in part.” And then we see Chrysostom
invoke the normative assumption about God’s essence. He continues, “Paul did
not say ‘imperfect’ because he knows one part of God’s essence and does not
know another part—for God is simple and has no parts” (De incomp. 1.32).
God’s essence is unknown to us; therefore, though we know he exists, is wise,
is great, is omnipresent, provides and cares for his creation, we do not know
the extent of these attributes nor how he does all the things in the governance
of his creation (De incomp. 1.33). Notice Chrysostom’s presumptive
statement: “God is simple and has no parts.” What is fascinating about Chrysostom’s
reference to the simplicity of God is that Modern theology sees simplicity as a
speculative doctrine. Chrysostom, who deliberately avoids speculative
theologizing, refers to simplicity as a standard article of theology proper.
God’s simplicity is taken for granted.
The reason why divine simplicity is seen as an abstruse doctrine is due to the
common (Modern) mistake of assuming that divine simplicity describes something
about God. Rather, properly understood, simplicity is a negative
statement; it tells us what God is not. In a sense, it is intended to be
abstruse because of its function in theological-metaphysical discourse. With
that said, we do use negative statements (i.e., infinite, immutable,
impassible, eternal, etc.) in a positive way—to good effect; but we do so, to
say what he is not. And that is the intention in apophatic qualifiers.
God, as Chrysostom states, does not have parts. He is what he is through
himself, thus his true essence, his divine constitution, is
simple (as the human constitution is composite). And while he aims to confine
his doctrinal formulations to the biblical text (not in a Biblicist fashion,
however), he employs the specific nomenclature of divine simplicity in his
theology. Why does Chrysostom take simplicity for granted? Because of the
implications derived from the biblical revelation of God. Chrysostom sees that
the God of the Bible is transcendent, thus incomprehensible, and apophatic
language provides an appropriate framework to speak about the God we cannot comprehend.
If you continue reading the rest of my exposition, you will see that Chrysostom is a
theologian who reads Scripture with the utmost attention to developing theology
from the biblical text. He seeks to be theologically responsible,
avoiding, as much as possible, any speculative discourse. He carefully and
patiently argues his position with stunningly rich exegesis, well-grounded in
revelation, with a fully systematic scope of vision. Interestingly, as it pertains
to a key theme of investigation in this book (i.e., my book project),
Chrysostom assumes the doctrine of divine simplicity as normative in the
Christian doctrine of God. It is telling about the immensely important role of
metaphysics, notably the Trinitarian classical metaphysic that proports divine
simplicity, in that one such as Chrysostom adopts it as properly basic to his
doctrine of God.
~ Romans 11:36
_________________________
[1] Micah
Wierenga, “John Chrysostom,” in Lexham Bible Dictionary.
[2] D.
F. Wright, “Chrysostom, John,” in New International Dictionary of the
Christian Church.
[3]
Saint John Chrysostom, On the Incomprehensible Nature of God, The
Fathers of the Church (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press,
1984). De incomprehensibili Dei natura homilae 1–12.
[4]
“Introduction,” in Ibid., 18.
[5]
“Introduction,” in Ibid., 26.
[6]
“Introduction,” in Ibid., 28.
Comments