Clement of Alexandria (c. 150–c. 215) was the head of the Catechetical School of Alexandria (c. 190), and the teacher of Origen. Concerned that Christianity is not seen as an unsophisticated religion, Clement sought to reconcile his faith with the best of Greek philosophy, specifically in the usefulness of Middle Platonism.[1] He believed that the kernels of truth found in Plato and Greek Philosophy were preparatory for the Gentiles in leading them to Christ, just as the Law was a guide or guardian for the Hebrews. Clement’s esoteric exegesis and speculative theology emphasized a higher knowledge, but this knowledge was obtained only through the Logos.
This post is a brief sampling of the nuances of Clement’s doctrine of God and its entailments of impassibility, creatio ex nihilo, and simplicity, consistent with the classical doctrines of God in the Great Tradition of the Christian faith.
Clement’s Stromata or miscellanies, it is a varied work of theology, unsystematic in its expression, with a key topic on that of the role of philosophy to theology in response to an outgrowth of Alexandrian Gnostics. In the Stromata we come across Clement’s speculative notions on the doctrine of God and a brief treatment on anthropomorphic language. Because his intentional audience are non-Christian Greeks, philosophy is the preparatory discipline to the Christian faith. [2] As God is the cause of all good things, with the Old and New Testaments as school masters to reveal Christ to the Jews, Clement writes, “Perhaps philosophy too was a direct gift of God to the Greeks before the Lord extended his appeal to the Greeks. For philosophy was to the Greek world what the Law was to the Hebrews, a tutor escorting them to Christ” (Gal 3:24) (Stra. 1.5.28).[3]
One of the challenges that accompanied the Hellenic mind was its gross misunderstanding of the ontological nature of Deity. The Greek gods were merely projections of man, exhibiting passions that swayed them to act in unrighteous anger, wickedness, and perversion. They had creaturely forms, thus they spoke and acted in a creaturely manner, albeit much more powerful than humans. But the God of the Bible is impassible. He is not a creature; he is uncreated, thus not like Greek pagan gods, who, while considered ‘gods’ were still contained within and circumscribed by the created realm. Therefore, Clement must explain to his audience how we are to understand passages that ascribe human affections or passions to God. Clement says:
It seems that we continually think of the Scriptures in worldly terms in such respects, making analogies from our own passions, wrongly accepting our understanding of the will of God (who is impassible) by the analogy of the stirrings within us. If we, who have a capacity for hearing, were to imagine a similar condition in the Almighty, we should be committing a godless error. It is not possible to speak of the divine in its actual nature. But even though we are fettered to flesh, it is possible for us to hear the Lord, accommodating himself to human weakness for our salvation, in the words of the prophets. (Stra. 2.16.72)
We must not confuse creature and Creator. Clement observes the vast distinction between God and creatures, when he states that “it is not possible to speak of the divine,” his incomprehensible sublimity and glory “in its actual nature.” If we think we can describe him as he is, the all-powerful One, we would be in great error. Therefore, because of our weak and “fettered” flesh, with Clement implying that even our creaturely mode of listening to the prophets’ declarations is part of that weakened condition, God accommodated himself to us to reveal Christ. And so, when a sinner obeys, repents, and believes upon the Lord for salvation with great joy, the Lord “has set his own seal on our joy.” God “receives joy without having experienced outward change because the person of his purpose has found joy in repentance” (Stra. 2.16.73).
A few sentences later, Clement addresses the Gnostic thought of emanation, which sees creation as an emanation of the divine nature. His point was to emphasize the distinction between God and man, in that God is uncreated, thus he has no natural relation to creatures. Clement writes, “It makes no difference whether we were formed from nothingness or from matter, since the former has no existence at all, and the latter is totally distinct from God—unless anyone is going to have the impertinence to say that we are a part of him and of the same substance as God” (Stra. 2.16.74). Clement’s statement is an implicit reference to the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. As you can see, Clement’s ontological doctrine of God affirms a total distinctness from creatures, which, for Clement, provides the backdrop to display God’s rich mercy and unsurpassing grace in that he shows his goodness to creatures who are, “by nature ‘alienated’ from him , . . “hav[ing] nothing to do with him (in our essential being or nature . . . )” (Stra. 2.16.75).
At the end of book 4 of The Stromata, we find a few interesting statements on God, the Son, and the Spirit. Clement tends to extend his liberties when venturing into speculative theology. While not unorthodox, it makes his style unique. In Stra. 4.25, Clement explains that perfection of man comes by means of the knowledge and love of God. He writes that God, in his essence, cannot be a “subject for demonstration.” However, Christ, the Son “is wisdom, and knowledge, and truth . . . and he is susceptible of demonstration and of description.” The collective powers of the Spirit become one and “terminate in the same point—that is, in the Son.” But the Spirit cannot be declared regarding his powers. Clement writes:
And the Son is neither simply one thing as one thing, nor many things as parts, but one thing as all things; whence also He is all things. For He is the circle of all powers rolled and united into one unity. Wherefore the Word is called the Alpha and the Omega, of whom alone the end becomes beginning, and ends again at the original beginning without any break. Wherefore also to believe in Him, and by Him, is to become a unit, being indissolubly united in Him; and to disbelieve is to be separated, disjoined, divided. (Stra. 4.25)
And he concludes this chapter emphasizing God’s eternal nature, being “without beginning,” who “is being” , . . “the first principle of the department of action,” “of reasoning,” and “of judgment” (Stra. 4.25).
In books 5–7, we piece together doctrinal statements representative of the classical doctrines of God. Clement, in an almost confession like manner, articulates the doctrine of divine simplicity, which he grounds on the uniqueness and unity of God. He starts with passages from the prologue of John’s Gospel, referring to “the only-begotten God” as the one revealing the Father, who comes from the “invisible and ineffable bosom of God.” A few sentences later he writes:
how can that be expressed which is neither genus, nor difference, nor species, nor individual, nor number; nay more, is neither an event, nor that to which an event happens? No one can rightly express Him wholly. For on account of His greatness He is ranked as the All and is the Father of the universe. Nor are any parts to be predicated of Him. For the One is indivisible; wherefore also it is infinite, not considered with reference to inscrutability, but with reference to its being without dimensions, and not having a limit. And therefore, it is without form and name. (Stra. 5.12, emphasis added)
For Clement, “nothing is antecedent to the Unbegotten.” And the unbegotten, the Logos made Flesh as our Lord Christ, Clement writes, “is the cause of all good things, as the first efficient cause of motion” (Stra. 7.2). That which does exists would not exist at all, “had God not willed it.” God foresees all things, possessing “from eternity the idea of each thing individually . . . taking in the whole in one view. . . . [And] in one glance, He views all things together, and each thing by itself” (Stra. 6.27).
Clement’s philosophical framework understands that God does not have a physical body, even though Scripture uses terms that denote God standing, sitting on his throne, using his right hand, his right arm, or moving. And while Scripture designates these terms to God, “[t]he First Cause is not then in space, but above both space, and time, and name, and conception” (Stra. 5.11). Likewise, the Son of God, having the same essence as the Father, Clement writes: “is never displaced; not being divided, not severed, not passing from place to place; being always everywhere, and being contained nowhere; complete mind; the complete paternal light; all eyes, seeing all things, hearing all things, knowing all things, by His power scrutinizing the powers.” Clement concludes with what becomes the embodiment of Christological doctrine in the Great Tradition: He “is the power of God . . . a power incapable of being apprehended by sensation . . . as being the Father’s most ancient Word before the production of all things, and his Wisdom” (Stra. 7.2). And it is this God “who gave himself in sacrifice for us . . . from that which needs nothing to that which needs nothing, and to that which is impassible from that which is impassible” (Stra. 7.3).
Clement is demonstrative of an integrative thinker, utilizing contemplative habits in his interpretation of Scripture and the philosophical constructs at his disposal to shape his Christian vision, establishing an intellectual tradition within the Christian faith. The embodiment of Faith he took hold of was grounded in his understanding of the Logos, the principle of Wisdom in the Word made flesh. In Clement, we see the emergence of the classical doctrines of the Great Tradition, showing that their lineage reaches far back to the early stages of the historic Christian faith.
~ Romans 11:36
[1] Lois Eveleth, “Clement of Alexandria and the Logos,” American Theological Inquiry 6, no. 2 (July 15, 2013): 40.
[2] Henny Fiskå Hägg, Clement of Alexandria and the Beginnings of Christian Apophaticism, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 69.
[3] Translation cited is from Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, Books 1–3 (The Fathers of the Church, Volume 85) (CUA Press, 2010). Citations from Books 4–7 are from, Roberts Alexander, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Cox, eds., The Ante-Nicene Fathers, Volume II: Fathers of the Second Century: Hermas, Tatian, Athenagoras, Theophilus, and Clement of Alexandria (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Company, 1885).
Comments